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Abstract Laplace wondered about the minimal choice of initial variables and
parameters corresponding to a well-posed initial value problem. Discussions
of Laplace’s problem in the literature have focused on choosing between spa-
tiotemporal variables relative to absolute space (i.e. substantivalism) or merely
relative to other material bodies (i.e. relationalism) and between absolute
masses (i.e. absolutism) or merely mass ratios (i.e. comparativism). This paper
extends these discussions of Laplace’s problem, in the context of Newtonian
Gravity, by asking whether mass needs to be included in the initial state at all,
or whether a purely spatiotemporal initial state suffices. It is argued that mass
indeed needs to be included; removing mass from the initial state drastically
reduces the predictive and explanatory power of Newtonian Gravity.
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1 Introduction & Motivation
Pierre Laplace had a problem. A big one. He wanted to know what information,
if any, would be sufficient to predict the future. This question was asked in a
much more precise way by Henri Poincare´ [1, 2]. What is the minimal choice,
if any, of initial variables and parameters that corresponds to a well-posed
initial value problem—that is, for any combination of the associated initial
determinate values, the relevant laws will determine a unique evolution [3]?
Poincare´ was the first to explicitly link this problem to the substantivalism–
relationalism debate about space and motion [1, 4]. In retrospect, in the con-
text of theories of gravity—in this paper we will focus on Newtonian Gravity
(NG)—we have now been focusing for more than three centuries on the ques-
tion of whether the initial data need include absolute or merely relational
quantities. That is, do we need positions, velocities and/or accelerations rel-
ative to absolute space (i.e. substantivalism), or is it sufficient to consider
distances, velocities and accelerations relative to other material bodies (i.e. re-
lationalism)?
Given the age and the importance of this debate, it should be surprising
that we have only very recently started considering explicitly whether we need
the absolute scales of dimensionful quantities (i.e. absolutism) or merely the
ratios between them (i.e. comparativism). Do we require an absolute distance
scale, or only ratios between distances? Do we require an absolute mass scale,
or only ratios between masses? In fact, mass has been the central example in
these recent discussions [5–7]—more on this in Subsection 3.1.
A third aspect of Laplace’s problem has been left out entirely: need we
include in our initial conditions, besides spatiotemporal quantities, any notion
of mass at all? Or can mass—the absolute mass scale and/or the mass ratios—
be reduced to initial spatiotemporal quantities (e.g. accelerations), such that
a purely spatiotemporal initial state can still correspond to a well-posed ini-
tial value problem, rendering such choice of purely spatiotemporal variables a
candidate solution to Laplace’s problem?
In other words, this papers considers Laplacian reductionism about mass
as it features in Newtonian Gravity. I will not distinguish between gravita-
tional and inertial mass, but take them to be equivalent—at least in the sense
of being numerically proportional. I am interested in reducing mass within
NG, rather than reducing NG as a whole to a more fundamental theory and
identifying a counterpart of Newtonian mass in that reduced theory. I will
argue that Newtonian mass is not reducible, in these specific Laplacian and
intra-theoretic senses, to spatiotemporal quantities; we should be primitivists
(i.e. non-reductionists).
I take the wish to solve Laplace’s problem—or rather a slightly extended
version of it, as discussed in Section 2—as sufficient motivation for consider-
ing Laplacian reductionism about mass, but it is worth briefly listing other
possible motivations. One modest motivation, which is arguably implicit in
Laplace’s problem, would be the desideratum of metaphysical parsimony, i.e.
Ockham’s razor. If a specific concept does no work—in some sense to be further
specified below—at all, Ockham urges us to expunge it from our theory. This
is to be distinguished from the much more radical motivation that drives many
empiricists: the urge to get rid of all unobservables/ theoretical terms, regard-
less of any other virtues they might have, such as explanatory power. This is
what motivates the different project of Machian reductionism—reconstructing
the masses from spatiotemporal data not just at the initial time but at any
number of instants of time, as described in detail below. Machian reductionism
is of roughly equal historical importance as the Laplacian project, but much
more broad and radical and therefore importantly distinct from it. It will
become important later on that it is merely the more modest motivation—a
methodological principle that I believe everyone should apply, regardless of any
sympathies for empiricism—that drives the specific Laplacian project of this
paper. One may but need not sign up to the more radical (Machian empiricist)
motivation to pursue the Laplacian project (and in fact I do not).
Finally, three more specific reasons for thinking, or at least hoping, that
Laplacian reductionism may be true, are to be mentioned briefly. Firstly, we
will see in Subsection 4.2 that Machian reductionism is in fact true (to a certain
extent). This naturally leads us to wonder whether this result extends to the
much more restricted Laplacian context.
Secondly, an extremely succesful method of accounting for observed galac-
tic rotation curves goes under the name of MOdified Newtonian Dynamics
(MOND) [8]. Newton’s law of Universal Gravitation gets enhanced, but only
in the regime where the accelerations are much smaller than a0 ≡ 10−10m/s2.
In the context of MOND, it thus seems much more natural to consider ini-
tial conditions in terms of accelerations. Now, proving Laplacian reduction-
ism about mass (to accelerations) within NG would not thereby prove it for
MOND, but since MOND is equal to NG for accelerations much larger than
a0, a refutation of reductionism within NG (in that regime) has as a corollary
that mass cannot be so reduced within MOND either.
Thirdly, I have argued elsewhere [7,9] that Baker’s attempt [6] at defending
comparativism about mass (see the second aspect of Laplace’s problem above)
in fact boils down to a Laplacian reduction of mass to accelerations.
2 The Project
Why did we ever introduce mass in the first place? We cannot observe (a parti-
cle having the property of having) mass as directly as, for instance, the location
of a massive object (relative to us). What we do observe however—pace Bar-
bour [2]—is that some trajectories (i.e. relative locations over time) do occur
in nature, say two celestial bodies approaching each other at ever increasing
speed, and other trajectories never occur, say two celestial bodies executing
the Argentine tango1,2. We postulate the primitive notion of mass because it
explains why certain patterns are allowed by nature and other patterns are
not. Mass therefore becomes indirectly observable. (Or so the standard story
goes. It is the aim of this paper to explore whether the same explanatory power
can be obtained without primitive masses.) More specifically, if we include the
values of the primitive masses in the initial state of our models of NG, and
postulate laws that refer to this notion of mass, it turns out that we can find
unique solutions to the corresponding initial value problems and thereby fix
the evolution of the system up to infinity. Including mass in our theory thus
allows us to 1) predict future states of the world based on past data. But not
only that. It turns out that in addition we can 2) explain the observed particle
trajectories. Why this is the case is most easily illustrated by showing why the
reductionist theory is lacking in this respect, as will be done in several places
below. In a nutshell, in the mass theory (i.e. the primitivist theory) the initial
variables and parameters can take on all3 possible values, whereas the reduc-
tionist theory exhibits ad-hoc, holistic, brute (i.e. unexplained! ) constraints
on the initial values (which cannot even be formulated without piggy-backing
on the mass theory). Finally, if we range over all the values the initial vari-
ables and parameters could take, and solve the initial value problems for each
of these cases, we obtain the correct4,5 set of empirically possible models. In
other words, including mass gives us the correct 3) counterfactuals and other
modal claims of the Newtonian Theory of Gravity. What more could we
want from a physical theory?
The three virtues above provide a rough characterisation of the ‘work’ that
the notion of mass seems to do within our theory despite not being directly ob-
servable (or more precisely, as directly observable as relative distances). If we
can show that spatiotemporal quantities could do that work all by themselves,
then it was never really (i.e. fundamentally) the notion of mass which did all
that work (contrary to the standard story above), and we could get rid of a
primitive notion of mass and perhaps should do so on grounds of Ockham’s
1 One might respond that we could simply hold a massive object in each hand, and feel
the potentially different weights, despite there being no spatiotemporal difference. However,
the experience of the strength of that force in one’s brain is correlated with and reducible
to the depth to which the massive object protrudes into our skin, that is our somatosensory
nervous system. Even weighing an object in one’s hand is consistent with the claim that all
observation is spatiotemporal.
2 Similar sentiments are echoed by Bell (“[I]n physics the only observations we must
consider are position observations...” [10, p.166]), Holland (“[A]ll experiments in the real
world ultimately reduce to the determination of position. As far as we are aware this [as-
sumption] is completely in accord with actual laboratory practice” [11, p.350]) and Jammer
(“[I]n the last analysis all measurements in physics are kinematic [i.e. spatiotemporal] in
nature...” [12, p.6]).
3 Except perhaps for negative mass values, but these can be made irrelevant if we take it
as a fundamental feature of the gravitational law that it is attractive and thus only cares
about the magnitudes of the masses. (See Jammer [12, Ch.4] for a historical overview of the
search for negative (gravitational) masses.)
4 In the regime of applicability of the theory.
5 See fn.6.
razor. More specifically, for our specific (i.e. Laplacian) reductionist project
to succeed, we would need to purge mass from our initial state, leaving only
spatiotemporal quantities, and have our laws refer only to those spatiotem-
poral quantities. If the corresponding initial value problems give the correct,
unique solutions, we can 1) predict future data using past data that is purely
spatiotemporal. Provided there are no unexplained constraints on the initial
data, we can also 2) explain the observed or allowed particle trajectories. Fi-
nally, if we then range over all the possible initial spatiotemporal states, and
again get the correct6 set of empirically possible models, the 3) counterfactuals
and other modal claims are also recovered without having invoked the notion
of mass.
The most obvious way to proceed with this Laplacian reductionist project
seems to be to find an operational definition of mass in terms of spatiotemporal
quantities. We can then directly substitute7 the notion of mass in the initial
state and the laws with these spatiotemporal quantities, and our work is done.
Mach’s famous operational definition of mass immediately springs to mind.
Indeed, we will shortly start our discussion with Mach. However, it is important
to flag at this point once more that Mach’s more radical, empiricist project is
substantially different from the more specific Laplacian project just outlined,
as will be discussed in more detail below. Thus, although it would be imprudent
not to start off our discussion with Mach’s famous operational definition, Mach
exegesis is not the aim of this paper; as soon as our Laplacian project diverges
from his, we will leave Mach behind. (In another paper Machian reductionism
plays a more primary role in my discussion—albeit under the name of Humean
or Regularity eliminativism [14].)
Before moving on we need to make more explicit what was already implicit
in the previous story: how far do we want to go? One current strand of re-
6 Correct in (at least) the sense of being in agreement with folk science—“If I had dropped
this cup, it would have fallen to the ground”; “Two celestial bodies cannot execute the Ar-
gentine tango”; “If the two particles described in Subsection 3.1 had (in)sufficient initial
velocity, they would escape (collide)”. Of course we have access to counterfactuals only in-
directly: we first choose the best theory to represent and explain the actual world (within
the relevant regime), and only then infer counterfactual claims by inspecting what evolution
this theory would generate for counterfactual initial conditions. In a sense it thus seems
circular to claim that Newtonian Gravity generates the correct set of empirically possible
worlds (within the Newtonian regime), beyond the non-trivial claim that Newtonian Grav-
ity is indeed the best theory in light of the empirical data in the actual world (within the
Newtonian regime). It is logically possible and it would be interesting to consider a totally
different Newtonian theory, without mass, that manages to represent and explain the ac-
tual world as well as or even better than Newtonian Gravity with primitive masses, whilst
nevertheless having different modal consequences. I criticise a similarly revisionist option
elsewhere [7, Ch.3&4.4.2]. In this paper I am in the first instance interested in the less radi-
cal project of trying to remove a primitive notion of mass from standard Newtonian Gravity
without revising that theory—that is, while maintaining the same modal consequences. We
are considering reducing mass to other primitives within the same theory, not coming up
with a distinct theory. Once this fails, a distinct project could then be to search for such a
revisionary theory as just described, but that is outside the scope of this paper.
7 Zanstra [13] adopts a similar ‘substitution approach’ in the analogous debate on rela-
tionalism about space.
search considers a moderate version of reducing mass. It considers taking some
notion of mass to be fundamental, namely the mass determinates—i.e. it is a
matter of fact whether two massive particles are equally massive or not—but
aims to derive its further quantitative structure—ordering8, metric9 and ad-
ditive structure10—from for instance the dynamics11. Both the Laplacian and
the Machian project are interested in reducing mass altogether12, not merely
its quantitative structure. Keeping in mind the desideratum of metaphysical
parsimony, it is simply not clear what work the fundamental mass determi-
nates are still supposed to do once their quantitative structure has already
been reduced away.
As I have already dismissed a famous argument against reductionism by
McKinsey, Sugar & Suppes elsewhere [7, §6.2], Section 3 dives straight into
Mach’s operational definition of mass. Section 4 treats historical responses
to Mach, culminating in my main argument against Laplacian reductionism
about mass in Subsection 4.3. Section 5 responds to two loopholes in the
argument, before the conclusion that Newtonian mass is not reducible—in the
Laplacian and intra-theoretic senses—to spatiotemporal quantities without
loss of explanatory and predictive power.
3 Mach
Mach is well-known for providing the first operational definition of inertial
mass [18]. He vehemently opposed employing ‘hidden’ metaphysical notions
such as mass in physics in order to explain observable phenomena. The task
of physics is merely the “abstract quantitative expression of facts” [18, p.502]
concerning the relations between observable phenomena. He defines inertial
mass (relations) in terms of observable accelerations (or more correctly, accel-
eration relations) only, a feat that so inspired the logical empiricists.
Consider two particles, which are either alone in the universe or approxi-
mately dynamically isolated from any other matter. If F12 is the force exerted
on particle 1 by particle 2, and F21 the force exerted on particle 2 by particle
1, then Newton’s third law gives F12 = −F21. But Newton’s second law also
gives F12 = m1a12 and F21 = m2a21, where a12 denotes the acceleration of
particle 1 due to particle 2, and vice versa. Combining this to eliminate the
8 Whether a massive particle is less or more massive than another particle with a different
mass determinate.
9 The ratio between the masses of two massive particles.
10 How the mass of one massive particle compares to the combined mass of two other
massive particles.
11 Dees [15] advocates a position like this. Perry [16] considers a more varied range of
reductionist projects, including the Machian project.
12 See also Esfeld & Deckert’s project [17] and my paper on regularity comparativism and
regularity eliminativism about mass [14].
(directly) unobservable notion of force, we obtain13:
m1
m2
= −a21
a12
. (1)
We have operationally defined the mass ratio of these two isolated particles,
or simply “named” [18, p.266] their acceleration relations as Mach would put
it.
Of course our actual universe does not consist merely of (subsystems of)
two isolated particles. Perhaps we could manually approximately isolate such
systems (in turns) on the surface of the Earth where we dwell—or, since we
can never perfectly isolate any system from gravity, obtain the mass ratios via
the limit of a series of better and better isolated two-particle subsystems—but
this would not be an option when considering celestial objects [20]. It definitely
will not be an option in the generic messy, crowded worlds that we consider
in this paper14. This raises the important question of whether the previous
procedure can be consistently generalised to a larger system of interacting
particles. Two issues arise. Firstly, the operational definition depends on the
component of the acceleration of a particle that is induced by a single other
particle, whereas we only have empirical access to the total acceleration. In
Subsection 4.1 we will consider whether these individual components can be
retrieved from the total acceleration.
The second issue is prior to the first, since it arises even if we could (per
impossibile, in general) isolate each pair of particles (in turns). Consider a
universe with three or more particles. Step 1: take particle 1 and 2 away from
the other matter, such that they form an effectively isolated subsystem. Obtain
their mass ratio from the acceleration ratio via Mach’s protocol. Step 2: repeat
for particle 2 and 3. What can we now expect if we repeat this for particle 1
and 3? Will it satisfy the following consistency check:(
m1
m3
)
s3
=
(
m1
m2
)
s1
·
(
m2
m3
)
s2
, (2)
13 Note that in general a21
a12
depends on the reference frame, although it will be constant
across inertial reference frames. Mach’s definition therefore also depends on the first law [12,
p.15], which provides the notion of an inertial frame. However, operationalising the inertial
frames brings with it its own problems. Pendse [19] proves that there exists an infinite set of
special non-inertial frames such that observers at rest with respect to those frames obtain
positive and constant values for the mass ratios via Mach’s operational definition, which
nevertheless differ from the corresponding values found in the inertial frames. Importantly,
those observers will not be able to tell that they are not in an isolated, inertial frame. Note
that these problems are irrelevant to the project in this paper: we take the initial spatiotem-
poral quantities with respect to some inertial frame to be given, and use them to attempt
to calculate the emergent masses and the evolution of the system. The Machian project—
“the heuristic aspect” in Pendse’s terminology [19, p.55]—on the other hand starts out with
observed trajectories only, and needs to somehow reconstruct the inertial spatiotemporal
quantities before one may derive the mass (ratios).
14 Here I sympathise with Barbour’s warning not to be “misled by the special circumstances
of our existence. ... Take a billion of particles and let them swarm in confusion - that is the
reality of ‘home’ almost everywhere in the universe. The stars do seem to swarm... We must
master celestial [determination of mass ratios] and not be content with the short cuts that
can be taken on the Earth, for they hide the essence of the problem” [2, p.137-8].
where si indicates the instance of the operational procedure (i.e. step) used to
determine that mass ratio? If absolute15 masses are primitive properties of the
particles, this condition is satisfied as a matter of logical neccesity . In Mach’s
framework, this equation is satisfied only if(
−a31
a13
)
s3
=
(
−a21
a12
)
s1
·
(
−a32
a23
)
s2
. (3)
But the accelerations which particle 1 and 2 induce in each other and which
particle 2 and 3 induce in each other place no (logical) constraints on the
accelerations which particle 1 and 3 induce in each other. Mach acknowledges
this. For him it is just a brute empirical fact that it does not matter which
particle we use as a standard to compare every other particle to; any standard
will provide the same mass ratios. But this is just another way of saying
that the reductionist assumes a highly mysterious and holistic fact without
any explanation whatsoever. A fact that is trivially explained—as a matter of
logical necessity!—if absolute masses are taken to be fundamental. We here
encounter the first loss of explanatory power for the reductionists—something
that might not bother the Machian but does bother the Laplacian.
If this empirical fact is nevertheless assumed, one can then proceed by
choosing one of the particles as the standard unit of mass, say 1kg or 1lb, in
order to fix all the other masses via the consistently determined mass ratios.
(Note that knowing the absolute accelerations would not by itself help to fix
the absolute masses.) Mass thus seems to have been reduced to acceleration
relations.
3.1 Mach & Comparativism
Before evaluating Mach’s definition qua reductionist project, it is worthwhile
pointing out that this definition also makes him a comparativist about mass
(as opposed to an absolutist). Absolutism about mass is the view that mass
ratios16 between material bodies obtain in virtue of the absolute (i.e., roughly,
intrinsic [7, §1.1.2] [21]) masses of those bodies [5, 7]. Comparativism denies
this. Comparativists then often (but not always [14]) take absolute masses to
have no empirical meaning; they are merely a convention. Thus, since Mach
operationally defines only mass ratios, if anything, and arrives at absolute
quantities merely via a convention, this makes him a comparativist.
Is any justification given for stopping at this point and not continuing
to provide a further operational definition of the absolute masses? Before re-
sponding to this question, it should be pointed out that the absolutist should
rejoice in Mach’s achievement, as far as it goes. The absolutist acknowledges
mass ratios of course, and has never claimed that masses (either the absolute
15 For comparativism about mass—defined below—an analogous issue of consistency or
transitivity arises [21] [7, Ch.5].
16 Mass relations, more generally. But I will follow Baker [6] in focusing on mass ratios.
masses or mass ratios) are ‘directly observable’ (or more correctly, as directly
observable as relative distances). If mass were ‘directly observable’ the whole
debate between absolutism and comparativism would not exist in the first
place—so the absolutists always admitted the need for a method of measuring
those mass relations. And this can of course only be done via (more directly)
observable, spatiotemporal notions, such as acceleration. Once we have this
operational definition of mass ratios though, do we also need a further opera-
tional definition of the absolute mass scale?
Since I have argued elsewhere in detail that Newtonian mass is absolute,
let me only briefly rehearse the core of that argument here [6,7,9]. Consider a
Newtonian world with two equally massive particles a distance r apart, with a
relative positive initial velocity v and zero angular momentum. How will this
world evolve?
Whereas this description corresponds to a unique choice of initial vari-
ables and parameters for the comparativist, the absolutist will demand that
more information is needed: this description is compatible with uncountably
infinitely many intrinsic masses. And, she claims, this choice is important, be-
cause for some choices of intrinsic masses the particles will escape each other
and for other choices they will collide/coincide17—two evolutions that are ob-
viously empirically distinct—depending on whether the following inequality is
satisfied:
v > ve =
√
2Gm
r
. (4)
It is clear from this inequality that the evolution depends on the initial abso-
lute masses of the particles, over and above their mass ratios. (Besides, once
the initial masses are fixed, the corresponding absolutist initial value problem
has a unique solution: absolutism is deterministic18.) The comparativist initial
state lacks the resources to distinguish between these two categories of evolu-
tions, with indeterminism between empirically distinct evolutions as a result.
Absolute masses are empirically relevant; adding absolute masses to the initial
state beyond mass ratios increases the predictive power.
Could we supplement Mach’s project with an operational definition of the
absolute mass scale? It seems that attempting to do so would not violate the
spirit of the original project. The main thrust of the Machian project was the
reduction of mass. Mach incorrectly interpreted ‘mass’ to refer to mass ratios
only. If we manage to additionally reduce the absolute mass scale, this would
complete the original project of reducing mass (now correctly understood as
both mass ratios and an absolute mass scale).
The obvious candidate for such an operational definition is exactly the
escape velocity scenario that was used to prove the empirical relevance of
17 In the case of non-zero angular momentum, the set of solutions that features coin-
ciding particles is of measure zero. In that case we may need to turn to the evolution of
shapes/angles to empirically distinguish the models, rather than coincidence.
18 Modulo some well-known exotic counter-examples [22,23].
absolute masses in the first place. The escape velocity inequality19 can be
reformulated in terms of spatiotemporal quantities only: v2 > v2e = 2ar. This
suggests that the absolute mass scale could be defined in terms of some ratio of
r, v and a20. Although this seems unproblematic for the case of two particles,
we will see below (Section 5) that this does not in fact generalise to more
particles.
4 Beyond Mach
4.1 Generalising to more particles
Let us now evaluate Mach’s project qua reductionism. Pendse famously points
out that Mach’s definition depends crucially on the simple two-particle scenario—
which initially seemed like a mere pedagogical simplification—and does not
generalise to any number of particles [25]. Mach’s definition requires the sep-
arate contributions induced by every other particle to the acceleration of a
specific particle, whereas we only have empirical access to the total accelera-
tion of that particular particle. In systems with too many particles the total
acceleration underdetermines the individual contributions. More specifically,
Pendse argues that, if we use only acceleration relations at one instant, the
mass-ratios are not uniquely determined for systems of more than four par-
ticles. Moreover, even if we consider acceleration relations at any number of
instants, systems with more than seven particles will not give a unique set of
mass ratios. I will briefly outline the first argument here [12].
Let n be the number of particles. ak is the observed, induced total accel-
eration of the kth body at t0, and uˆkj the unit vector in the direction from
body k to body j at t0. Then
ak =
n∑
j=1
akjuˆkj , (k = 1, . . . , n) (5)
where we solve for akj (akk = 0), the n(n−1) unknown coefficients in 3n linear
equations, which represent the induced acceleration on particle k by particle
j at t0. It is these coefficients that Mach needs to fix the mass ratios. They
are uniquely determined only if their number does not exceed the number
of equations, n(n − 1) ≤ 3n, and this is not the case for systems with more
than 4 particles. QED. The reader is referred to Pendse’s paper for the proof
concerning acceleration data at any number of instants.
19 This inequailty governs the special case where the mass ratio is one, but this could easily
be generalised
20 We may call this a (spatiotemporally) local operational definition. In Ref. [14] I discuss
an attempt at a global definition, namely a reduction of the absolute masses to the full
4D mosaic of particle trajectories (and perhaps their mass ratios). Dasgupta provides an
example of an alternative global definition. He introduces a notion of plural grounding,
and argues that the totality of kilogram facts is plurally grounded in the totality of mass
ratios [24].
4.2 Including other spatiotemporal quantities
Narlikar responds by echoing the thought that underlies the suggested oper-
ational definition of the absolute mass scale: accelerations might be insuffi-
cient, but we have other spatiotemporal notions at our disposal [26]. In par-
ticular, we can measure inter-particle distances as well as accelerations, and
insert them into the Gravitational Law21. Setting Newton’s constant to one
for convenience, we get the following equation for the (arbitrarily chosen22) x-
component of the acceleration of particle 1 due to the gravitational interaction
of all the other particles, at t0:
a1,x(t = t0) =
m2(x2 − x1)
r312
+
m3(x3 − x1)
r313
+ ...+
mn(xn − x1)
r31n
, (6)
where it is understood that the positions and distances are measured at t = t0
also. These, together with a1,x, can be observed, resulting in a linear equation
of the form
A12m2 +A13m3 + ...+A1nmn = X1, (7)
where only the m’s are unknown. Repeating this procedure for a total of
(n− 1) different instants, we get (n− 1) (supposedly)23 linearly independent
equations, allowing us to solve for m2,m3, ...mn. Observing in addition a single
acceleration-component of any of the other particles at t = t0 only is sufficient
to determine the remaining m1.
4.3 The main argument
It is here that we diverge from Mach’s reductionist project. Mach’s project
was of a reconstructive, descriptive and epistemological/empiricist nature. It
is the project of humans reconstructing (after the fact!) the masses from the
appearance of the four-dimensional mosaic generated by God24. Therefore,
21 Pendse [27] objects that we do not have independent empirical access to the Gravita-
tional Law. However, in the context of the project in this paper we simply take the laws as
given. In fact, Mach and Pendse’s own projects take Newton’s Laws as given, so why could
Narlikar not add the Gravitational Law to this?
22 This awkward arbitrariness stems from the slightly surprising attempt to reduce the n
degrees of freedom of a scalar, mass, to the 3n degrees of freedom of a vector, accelera-
tion [7, §6.6]. This arbitrary choice of an x-axis seems especially unjustified in the homoge-
neous Euclidean space in which Newtonian Gravity lives (pace Knox [28])—we seem to have
implicitly chosen a preferred axis, in a space which has no structure to ground such a notion.
Of course, if mass is a primitive notion it is easy to show that nothing depends on the choice
of axis; it is not clear why the same would necessarily be true in the reductionist framework.
As argued elsewhere, removing this arbitrariness by using all components of acceleration
instead forms no improvement [7, §6.6].
23 Although these equations may be linearly independent in general, presumably not all
specific instances will be so. What to do with those deviant cases? Perhaps it will turn out
that these specific systems are of measure zero in the space of solutions, and that that gives us
some reason to ignore them. Or perhaps these cases result in infinitely many solutions which
are all empirically equivalent. Or perhaps choosing a different set of instants to measure the
distances suffices to restore linear independence. All of this remains to be shown though.
24 See Ref. [14] for a discussion of reconstructing absolute masses using this approach.
using spatiotemporal data at any number of instants is perfectly acceptable;
we are here not in the business of explaining part of the data (the future data)
from other parts of the data (the initial state). And this project had better
work! We have been applying Newtonian physics succesfully for over three
centuries now. We have modeled and predicted the behaviour of the planets
in our solar system, based on presumed knowledge of the masses of those
planets. Thus, there had better be some response to the potential problems
with Narlikar’s argument as elaborated upon in footnote 23, unless we want
to invoke some error theory25 about the way we have been doing Newtonian
physics for the past three centuries.
In this paper we are however interested in the much more specific, meta-
physical, Laplacian project of explaining our actual world by deterministically
generating it from the initial conditions. That is, we are ‘playing God’, rather
than reconstructing some true, after-the-fact statements about God’s creation.
Hence, we are only allowed to use spatiotemporal data at the initial time26.
The future data is part of the explanandum, not the explanans. Using it would
be explanatorily circular. The tools used by Narlikar (and by Pendse when
proving his second claim) are not available in the context of this project of
solving Laplace’s problem27. In a slogan: compared to Machian reductionism,
Laplacian reductionism wants to achieve more (i.e. explanatory and predictive
power) with less (i.e. spatiotemporal data at the initial time only).
Does this mean that the Laplacian reductionist project is doomed? No. We
can retain Narlikar’s insight—that we have more spatiotemporal data at our
disposal than merely accelerations—but restrict ourselves to that additional
data at the initial time only.
If we could find an operational definition of the masses in terms of the
initial spatiotemporal notions, then this would guarantee that these initial
spatiotemporal notions would suffice (via some law which is obtained by sub-
stituting all references to mass by its operational definition) to generate a
unique evolution, since this is guaranteed by the initial masses (plus distances
positions and relative velocities). As we have seen that initial accelerations
are insufficient, we might follow Narlikar’s lead by including distances and
inserting them into the gravitational law. We start of with his Eq. 6 for the
x-component of the acceleration of particle 1 at t0, but instead of supplement-
ing it with similar equations at different instants, we consider the analogous
equations for the other particles at the same instant. For instance:
a2,x(t = t0) =
m1(x1 − x2)
r321
+
m3(x3 − x2)
r323
+
m4(x4 − x2)
r324
+ ...+
mn(xn − x2)
r32n
.
(8)
25 Beyond of course the obvious errors in the quantum and relativistic regimes.
26 Or perhaps an infinitesimally small initial period of time, see fn.36.
27 For similar reasons Schmidt’s reduction of mass [12,29] is disqualified.
We obtain the matrix equation Gm = a, where G is the following n×n matrix:
G =

0 α12 · · · a1n
α21 0
...
...
. . .
...
αn1 · · · · · · 0
 (9)
where αij =
xj−xi
r3ij
. Since αij = −αji28, G is an antisymmetric matrix. But
the determinant of an antisymmetric matrix with odd dimensions is singular!
Recall that it is a property of the determinant that |G| = |GT | and | − G| =
(−1)n|G|. For an antisymmetric matrix (GT = −G) these properties combine
to give |G| = |GT | = |−G| = (−1)n|G|. For odd n then |G| = −|G| = 0. Since
a unique solution requires a non-zero determinant, this proves that there is no
unique solution of masses. QED.
4.4 Unpacking the argument
What exactly follows from this? If the determinant had been non-zero, then
Laplacian reductionism would have been straightforwardly successful. It is
less straightforward whether the vanishing of the determinant rules out such
reductionism. A vanishing determinant (for systems with an odd number of
particles) proves that either there are no solutions or there are infinitely many
solutions. Given that standard Newtonian Gravity has some solutions, we know
that there are at least some sets of initial spatiotemporal quantities that fall
into the latter category. Are there any sets that fall into the former?
Horn 1: No solutions
One might think that the following set of initial spatiotemporal quantities does
not correspond to any (physical) solution. Consider a simple example of a sys-
tem consisting of three particles. Figure 1 depicts three collinear particles, with
the middle particle being one meter away from each of the outer particles. The
middle particle has zero acceleration, and the outer particles each an accelera-
tion of 1 m/s2 outwards. Since gravity is supposed to be attractive, one might
think that there are no mass solutions corresponding to this scenario, but there
are in fact two categories of (mathematical) solutions: one in which the middle
28 This is true only because Newtonian Gravity contains both Newton’s third law and
the principle of equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass—without for instance the
latter Eq. 6 would not have been as simple. This seems to suggest that if we were to go
beyond Newtonian Gravity by adding other forces which, for instance, do not obey a simi-
lar equivalence principle (such as the Coulomb Force), the argument against reductionism
would collapse. This cannot be true however, since this would only introduce more unknowns
(i.e. the electric charges) without extra ‘knowns’ to determine those unknowns (unless per-
haps the additional force depended on velocity and we could measure the velocities to aid
us).
1m 1m
1 m/s2 1 m/s2
Fig. 1: First example of a set of accelerations to which no (positive) mass
distribution corresponds.
1m 1m
1 m/s2 13 m/s21 m/s2
Fig. 2: Second example of a set of accelerations to which no mass distribution
(either positive or negative) corresponds.
particle has a negative mass and the other two a positive mass, and vice versa.
Although there is in fact a solution, this seems ‘unphysical’, since standard
NG with mass includes the postulate that masses are always positive29. Stan-
dard NG thus does not contain these types of solutions. What should we do
with such ‘non-physical’ solutions? Perhaps the reductionist could respond by
claiming that we can somehow throw away these mathematical solutions since
they are non-physical. We discuss such moves below. Instead I will now move
on to a more decisive example, where there are not even any mathematical
solutions.
In the second example all accelerations are ‘inwards’, which seems prima
facie compatible with the attractive nature of gravity. In Figure 2 the two
particles on the left accelerate with 1 m/s2 to the right, and the third particle
accelerates in the opposite direction with 13 m/s2. It is easy to show that
there is no solution in terms of masses, not even negative masses.
Could the reductionist just choose to (a priori) rule out those deviant sets
of initial spatiotemporal quantities? Especially Humeans about laws of nature
might be tempted by this approach. For instance, in the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis
Best Systems approach [30, 31] any true statement that is part of the best
system to axiomatise the data counts as a law. Thus, if the statement that
rules out these deviant sets of initial spatiotemporal quantities is part of the
best system, we could just postulate it as a law of our reductionist theory.
29 Or, that the gravitational law does not care about the sign of the masses.
Compare this to the Humean solution to the problem of the arrow of time: if
the Past Hypothesis (i.e. the claim that the initial entropy of the universe was
sufficiently low [32]) forms part of the best system, this allows us to promote
it to the status of law.
Apart from the standard complaints that such statements are not at all
the type of beast that we normally consider as a candidate for law-hood, it
is important that any such postulated constraint on the initial conditions is
neither ad hoc, nor unexplained. Moreover, this constraint should be formu-
latable without (implicitly) referring to masses, that is without piggy-backing
on the theory that takes masses to be primitive30. There are several reasons
to believe that these conditions are not satisifed.
Whereas the restriction on entropy was straightforward—the initial entropy
had to be below a certain value—the restrictions that would rule out the
deviant set of initial spatiotemporal quantities—or more specifically initial
accelerations—that do not correspond to any mass solution are much more
complicated. In fact, no value of initial acceleration for any individual particle
is ruled out from the start; the constraint takes on a holistic form instead. Only
if a particle is located ‘on the outside’, do we all of a sudden require that its
acceleration is not directed ‘outwards’. (Notice that this also holds for systems
with an even number of particles.) Similarly, once the initial accelerations of
all but one particle have been chosen, this can restrict the allowed values of
the acceleration of the ‘final’ particle (even if that particle was on the ‘inside’).
Leaving out the acceleration of a single particle from the initial conditions is
not an option since even when we do include this piece of acceleration the mass
solutions are already underdetermined in some cases (see below), nor would
this solve the former problem regarding outward accelerations. The choices of
the initial accelerations of a particle thus depend on the choices for the initial
accelerations of the other particles. It is as if the laws determine, after the
fact, in a holistic sense, which initial accelerations were allowed in the first
place. Namely, exactly those that correspond to initial masses. Inference to
the best explanation suggests that that is the case exactly because there are
fundamental (initial) masses. There is no non-ad-hoc, reductionist explanation
for ruling out the deviant sets of initial accelerations, especially not one that
does not piggy-back on the concept of mass. In contrast, these constraints are
trivially explained (by the attractive nature of gravity) if we do take masses
to be primitive.
Horn 2: Infinitely many solutions
Let us turn to the sets of initial spatiotemporal quantities that correspond
to an infinite set of solutions in terms of (initial) masses. These sets under-
determine the masses, and since different masses correspond, in general, to
30 Pooley [33, §5.4] discusses analogous issues (concerning Sklar’s relationalist manoeuvre
of adding primitive accelerations to the initial conditions) in the analogous substantivalism–
relationalism debate about space. See also Arntzenius [34, §5.7] on piggy-back relationalism.
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Fig. 3: The Smoking Gun: A numerical solution of the three-body problem
in one dimension (black trajectories), superimposed on an alternative solution
(red trajectories). Each three-body problem has only been solved until the first
collision, as the theory breaks down at that point. The initial states of each set
of three particles are identical with respect to the spatiotemporal quantities
(G = 1, d12 = d23 = 1, v1 = 0.2, v2 = 0.1, v3 = −0.5, a1 = 1.25, a2 = −1,
a3 = −1.5), but they differ in terms of their masses (mr1 = 5.5, mr2 = 0.125,
mr3 = 4.5; m
b
1 = m
b
2 = 1.2, m
b
3 = 0.2). Note that they do not only differ in
their absolute masses but also their mass ratios! These different sets of masses
generate empirically distinct evolutions! Particle 2 collides first with particle
3 within the red solution, but first with particle 1 within the black solution.
different (metaphysical) evolutions of the system, an initial state that con-
tains only spatiotemporal data leads to an indeterministic evolution (if there
is any well-defined evolution in the first place). Such a reductionist theory
will not provide the explanatory and predictive power that NG with primitive
masses does.
The first, most obvious line of responses consists of variations on the theme
that perhaps each set of infinite solutions is similar enough, in some sense, to
‘count as one’ and to therefore effectively form a single unique solution.
Variation 1: it might be the case that, even though each of these sets of
initial spatiotemporal quantities corresponds to several distinct possible sets
of masses each of which lead to metaphysically distinct evolutions, these re-
spective distinct evolutions are in fact all empirically equivalent. If this is true
for each set of initial spatiotemporal quantities that has multiple solutions,
this would not only save the reductionist project, but also prove that the mass
theory recognises distinct metaphysically possible models that are empirically
indistinguishable, which violates the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles
(that is, a specific instance of our principle of metaphysical parsimony, i.e. Ock-
ham’s razor).
Variation 2: Perhaps each set of infinitely many solutions consists of solu-
tions that differ only with respect to the intrinsic masses but not with respect
to the mass ratios. If so, the reductionist has at least partially succeeded by
reducing the mass ratios, if not the absolute masses.
The easiest, most conclusive way to kill both variations with one stone is by
providing a single counter-example to both. Figure 3 shows two superimposed
numerical solutions of the three-body problem in one dimension. The solutions
are generated from initial conditions that agree with respect to the spatiotem-
poral quantities, but disagree with respect to their initial masses (which in
both cases are compatible with the spatiotemporal initial state) and moreover
their mass ratios (against variation 2). Both solutions clearly generate empir-
ically distinct evolutions (against variation 1), since in one case the middle
particle collides first with the particle on the left, and in the other case its first
collision is with the particle on the right31. Moreover, even if the mass ratios
had been the same in this example, it would have served to reiterate the point
made in Subsection 3.1 that absolute masses make an empirical difference.
Thus, it would make salient that under variation 2 the need for fundamental
absolute masses would remain, which anyway provide the mass ratios for free,
thereby making such a partial reduction of the mass ratios good for nothing.
Secondly, the reductionist might suggest that including the ‘y’ and ‘z’ com-
ponents of the acceleration might serve to remove the underdetermination and
provide unique mass solutions. We should immediately feel uneasy about this
suggestion: when attempting to fix n mass degrees of freedom one would ex-
pect to need n acceleration degrees of freedom, not an additional 2n more!32
More on this in Section 5. But even when we do allow ourselves these extra
degrees of freedom, this move will not work. The one-dimensional case is still a
specific instance of the three-dimensional case. In scenarios were the ‘y’ and ‘z’
components of acceleration are zero, all components of acceleration together
still underdetermine the masses and thereby the evolution of the system.
31 It might be argued that one cannot compare which particle is left or right of the middle
between different solutions. One could avoid this by adding an extra particle sufficently
far from these free particles to be dynamically isolated from them, in order to serve as a
reference for, say, ‘left’. However, the two solutions are clearly not each other’s mirror image,
so adding an extra reference particle is not really required.
32 On reflection, it is quite strange that we are trying to reduce the n degrees of freedom of
mass, a scalar, to acceleration, which—as a vector—has 3n degrees of freedom, in the first
place. This asymmetry provides the basis for an additional argument against reductionism
developed elsewhere [7, §6.6].
Thirdly, the reductionist might bite the bullet and accept indeterminism
(at the initial time only). Perhaps there are alternative, reductionist laws which
allow for several possible evolutions of the initial spatiotemporal state—one for
each of the evolutions that correspond to the mass solutions compatible with
that initial spatiotemporal state—but once a specific evolution has ‘begun’ it
follows through, deterministically, until the end. In other words, the laws are
indeterministic relative to the initial instantaneous state, but not relative to an
initial chunk of the evolution. At this point I can only respond by pointing out
that the onus is on the reductionist to provide such indeterministic laws that
generate the correct set of empirically possible evolutions33. Even if successful,
it seems that such an approach would nevertheless weaken the predictive power
of the theory.
5 Bits and bobs
Have we ruled out that mass can be reduced to initial spatiotemporal quanti-
ties? At least two issues need to be dealt with before we can conclude so.
The main argument rests on the substantive premise that the number
of particles n is odd. This may not be true of the actual world. Especially
Humeans about laws of nature might jump on this loophole, and just take the
statement that n is even to be part of the best reductionist system, which jus-
tifies promoting it to the status of a law, thereby avoiding my main argument.
However, first of all, it just seems that such a statement is not at all the kind of
statement that is a candidate for being a law—why would it be nomologically
necessary that n is even? Secondly, it could well be false of the actual world
that n is even. Thirdly, even if n just happens to be even in the actual world,
the reductionist still has to prove that Gm = a is solvable (where G is given by
Eq. 9). The attractive nature of gravity is enough to show that even in those
worlds there will be initial spatiotemporal conditions that do not correspond to
any set of positive34 masses, namely those where the particles ‘on the outside’
have an acceleration that points away from all the other matter. Fourthly, it
may seem that adding this extra law makes the axiomatic system ‘better’ by
making it much stronger at the cost of only a small reduction of simplicity,
but given the sheer amount of dynamically possible worlds (  nn where n is
a large number), merely halving that large number at the cost of moving from
four laws to five is actually not that advantageous35. Fifthly, assuming a non-
revisionary reductionist—as suggested in Section 2—who wants to reproduce
33 Dasgputa [35] is developing an analogue of this project in response to the accusation
that relationalism about handedness, space and mass are all indeterministic. That case seems
much simpler though than the case considered in this paper.
34 Although, for e.g. a system with four masses on the vertices of a square, all with ac-
celerations of equal magnitude pointing outwards along the diagonals, there is one unique
solution if we were to allow negative masses. (It consists of masses of equal magnitude (the
exact value depending on the acceleration magnitude), but the masses on one diagonal have
a negative sign, whereas the masses on the other diagonal have a positive sign.)
35 I would like to thank David Wallace for pointing this out to me.
all the consequences of and the work being done by the standard form of NG
(i.e. with primitive masses), the reductionist theory needs to generate all the
empirically possible models of standard NG. This includes models with an odd
number of particles, even if none of those represents the actual world. Finally
and most importantly, the main argument still goes through for quasi-isolated
subsystems of an odd number of particles. Thus, even if our universe consisted
of an even number of particles, there will (probably) still be solar systems with
an odd number of celestial objects. (It would have been nice for my purposes
if that were true of our own solar system—ignoring asteroids etc.—but alas!)
Let us now turn to the last cluster of related issues. The focus in this
paper has mainly been on accelerations (and distances). Have we ruled out
a reduction of mass to any type or combination of types of spatiotemporal
quantities, or only a reduction to accelerations (and distances)? We gain some
insight into this question when we return to the issue of operationally defining
the absolute mass scale (Subsection 3.1; assuming we would have been able to
fix the mass ratios). Earlier I suggested that we could perhaps use the escape
velocity scenario for this purpose. The escape velocity inequality obeyed by
that scenario can be rewritten in terms of r, v and a only, suggesting that we
define the absolute mass scale via some ratio of r, v and a. However, Figure 3
has not only proven that mass ratios cannot be reduced to accelerations (and
distances), it also proves that the absolute mass scale cannot be defined in
terms of r, v and a once we have more than two particles. For in that figure not
only the initial distances and accelerations of the two superimposed solutions
agreed, but also the initial velocities. Thus, an initial spatiotemporal state
containing spatiotemporal quantities up till second order fails to solve the
reductionist project.
Could we include higher-order spatiotemporal quantities? Since these can-
not be analytically determined from NG with primitive masses, it is difficult to
answer this question36, but since this would mean adding even more ‘degrees
of freedom’ this does not seem to be a viable option. We are trying to reduce n
mass degrees of freedom to more than n spatiotemporal quantities. These ex-
tra quantities cannot be truly degrees of freedom; they cannot be independent
of the n degrees of freedom. Either they 1) will lead to inconsistencies in the
determination of the masses, or 2) they will always conspire to take on exactly
36 Perhaps the following serves as a plausibility argument for an upper bound on the order
k of initial spatiotemporal data that would guarantee removing the underdetermination of
mass (although the overdetermination problem, resulting in conspiratorial (i.e. unexplained!)
constraints, still remains). On one popular view, the “at-at” theory of motion, (initial)
velocities are not in fact properties of an (initial) instant, but of an infinitesimal (initial)
period of time. After all, velocity is usually defined as lim
dt→0
r(t+dt)−r(t)
dt
, which is a property
intrinsic to [t, t + dt]. In general, the initial kth-order time derivative of r is a property of
[t0, t0 + kdt]. In a slogan: ‘God was not done when he created the initial configuration and
the laws, but he had to also specify the subsequent k − 1 configurations (depending on the
order of initial spatiotemporal data that we are considering)’. Now, if k = n+ 1, this initial
period (of n + 1 instants) effectively contains n − 1 independent sets of accelerations (and
even more sets of distances). Narlikar’s method then guarantees that this initial data fixes
the masses.
the right values as to avoid inconsistencies. Such a mysterious, conspiratorial
constraint—which presumably cannot even be formulated without referring to
mass37—would be totally unexplained, even if imposing this constraint on the
initial spatiotemporal state would uniquely fix the evolution.
6 Conclusion
Laplace wondered about the minimal choice of initial variables and parame-
ters corresponding to a well-posed initial value problem. This paper considered
Laplace’s problem in the context of Newtonian Gravity, and asked whether
mass needs to be included in the initial state, or whether it could be sub-
stituted with a purely spatiotemporal initial state. It has been argued that
such Laplacian reduction of Newtonian mass to spatiotemporal quantities—
especially accelerations and distances—is false. Removing mass from the initial
state drastically reduces the predictive and explanatory power of Newtonian
Gravity. As a corrolary, Laplacian reductionism is also false in the context of
MOND.
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